The hollowing-out, or two poles hypothesis is tested in the context of a Markov chain model of exchange rate transitions. In particular, two versions of the hypothesis--that hard pegs are an absorbing state, or that fixes and floats form a closed set, with no transitions to intermediate regimes-are tested using two alternative classifications of regimes. While there is some support for the lack of exits from hard pegs (i.e. that they are an absorbing state), the data generally indicate that the intermediate cases will continue to constitute a sizable fraction of actual exchange rate regimes. 
Exchange Rate Regime Transitions
Some have argued that the only sustainable regimes are free floating and hard exchange rate commitments-essentially currency boards or monetary unions (Eichengreen, 1994 (Eichengreen, , 1998 Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1995) . For instance, Eichengreen (1994, pp. 4-5) says that "... contingent policy rules to hit explicit exchange rate targets will no longer be viable in the twenty-first century ... [C] ountries ... will be forced to choose between floating exchange rates on the one hand and monetary unification on the other."
Similarly, Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995, p. 74) state "… there is little, if any, comfortable middle ground between floating rates and the adoption of a common currency." Hence, in the view of these authors, in the future we will see a disappearance of the middle ground that corresponds to soft commitments to some sort of intermediate exchange rate regime-adjustable pegs, crawling pegs, or bands, and perhaps also managed floating.
This view is sometimes called the "two poles" or "hollowing out" (e.g. Eichengreen, 1994, p. 6 ) theory of exchange rate regimes, and is based on the observation that higher capital mobility makes exchange rate commitments increasingly fragile. However, like the optimal currency area literature, which is essentially static, an explicit or implicit assumption is made that regimes are chosen to last forever, and from this perspective, one would only choose a regime that could be sustained once and for all. Only the hardest peg and the absence of any exchange rate commitment whatsoever are likely to qualify on that basis. Thus Eichengreen (1994, p. 5) , states "This will rule out the maintenance for extended periods of pegged but adjustable exchange rates, crawling pegs, and other regimes in which governments pre-announce limits on exchange rate fluctuations ..."
(italics added).
However, exchange rate regimes, like other aspects of economic policy, are not chosen once and for all. In fact, history shows us that countries change their regimes frequently, either voluntarily or involuntarily.
1 A particular exchange rate regime may suit the country's needs at the time-for instance, a peg may be the only way to halt a hyperinflation-but eventually be abandoned even though inflation has been brought down, because there has been a substantial loss of competitiveness. 2 This is the typical sequence with exchange rate based stabilizations-only rarely do they lead to "permanent" pegs. For instance, Poland in 1990 introduced a fixed peg to the dollar to provide an anchor for the price level, which was followed a year later by a crawling band introduced to limit appreciation of the real exchange rate, and, more recently, has moved to flexibility of the zloty exchange rate. Similarly, Brazil succeeded in eradicating hyperinflation in the mid-1990s through the "real plan," which involved a dollar peg with a very slow rate of crawl. Since 1999, this regime has been replaced by a flexible rate accompanied by inflation targeting. Only if we believed that countries will never be in the situation of using an exchange peg to disinflate (or never again suffer strong inflationary shocks) would it make sense to argue that countries will never use adjustable pegs as a temporary strategy, but instead will always be at one of the two poles.
3
Regimes intermediate between a hard fix and a clean float may also be chosen as part of a regional integration strategy. The Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the European Monetary System, and its predecessor, the Snake, are examples of this. While 1 For instance, Klein and Marion (1997) look at the duration of pegs (not regimes, as is done here), and find that the Latin American pegs in their sample last on average 10 months. 2 Their have been few formal attempts to model transitions between regimes. A notable exception is Bhandari, Flood, and Horne (1989) . 3 Of course, using a peg in this way requires an exit strategy, something considered in Eichengreen, Masson, et al. (1999) .
the ERM has led to membership in a currency union (one of the poles) for 11 of the countries concerned, it lives on in the form of the ERM2 for countries that may subsequently want to join EMU. And it remains an open question whether for other regions integration may stop short of monetary union, and only involve limiting fluctuations among members' currencies.
Transitions between regimes may also reflect the shifting preferences of policymakers (and the public): a populist government may attempt to stimulate output at the expense of exchange rate stability, only to be followed by a more conservative and stability-oriented administration. The exchange rate regime chosen in each case need not be at one or another of the poles. Indeed, for many developing countries, free floating is not a viable option because of a lack of well-developed financial markets and institutions, including a deep foreign exchange market, while the hard constraints of currency boards are not politically acceptable. As a result, the exchange rate regime is not necessarily stable, but fluctuates among various alternative intermediate regimes, depending on the relative weight given to sustaining activity or limiting inflation, and on the shocks hitting the economy.
It is therefore useful to think of exchange rate regime choice not as a once-andfor-all decision but rather in terms of the likelihood of moving from one regime to
another. In what follows, it is assumed that the probability of being in one or another regime next period depends only on the current regime. While somewhat restrictive, it supposes that the typical country will face the same likelihood that some shock will push it from its current regime to one of the others-independent of past history. 
Properties of Markov chains and transition matrices
It is useful to start with some definitions and basic results (see Feller 1957, chapter 15) . We assume that the stochastic process for the choice of exchange rate regimes can be described by a Markov chain, such that the probability of a given country being in each of the n regimes depends only on its regime in the most recent previous period. 5 It is convenient to write the probability of regime s t =j given s t-1 =i as p ij , and to collect the transition probabilities in a matrix P={ p ij }, with the sum across each row equal to unity. In our case, we can represent the transition matrix as follows:
General Case
Probability of Regime in period t float)-call this the row vector π 0 --then the distribution of regimes in period 1 will be π 1 =π 0 P and in period 2, π 2 =π 1 P, etc. So the limiting (long-run) distribution will be π=lim n→∞ π 0 P n . The long-run distribution for an important subset of Markov chains, 6 is independent of the initial distribution, and is also called the invariant distribution (it is equal to any row of the matrix lim P n , as n goes to infinity). For all of the subcases consistent with the hollowing-out hypothesis, the long-run distribution is invariant, and implies no regimes in the intermediate category.
It is relevant in any case to compare the current distribution to the long-run
distribution. An interesting possibility, for instance, would be that the invariant distribution implied much greater regime polarization than what prevails now (even if the hollowing out hypothesis is not strictly true). As is well known from the persistence in the use of reserve currencies, exchange rate regimes are slow to change, so that the effects of a new economic environment (involving for instance capital account liberalization) might take a long time to be visible in the number of countries in each regime category. Thus, a trend toward polarization might not yet be evident in the actual regime distribution though it would show up in the invariant distribution (and in the transition matrix). Thus, testing of the hollowing-out hypothesis is best done using the latter.
Testing the hollowing out hypothesis
The hypothesis that eventually all regimes do converge to fixed or floating means that the intermediate regime gets a zero weight in the invariant distribution, and this is equivalent to the zero restrictions on the transition matrix described above. Strictly speaking, the existence of transitions toward the intermediate regime from fixes and floats (i.e. non-zero transition probabilities) would be incontrovertible evidence that the hypothesis is false. However, the approach to hypothesis testing taken in Bhat (1972) and p 32 =0.
The log likelihood function for each of the estimates can be written as:
Maximum likelihood estimates of the two matrices correspond to the sample frequencies of transitions between the regimes, with only the non-zero transitions being included in the restricted case (Bhat 1972, p. 99) . A likelihood ratio statistic equal to twice the difference in the maximized values of log likelihood functions in the two cases is distributed as a chi-square with degrees of freedom equal to two, the number of restrictions. Since the first term (in B above) is common to both, the likelihood ratio can be written 2 Σ i Σ j n ij ln P ij 0 /P ij where the summation is taken only over the non-zero cells. 7 If this statistic is significant, we reject the hypothesis of hollowing out.
Classification of regimes
The We estimate transition matrices using two data sources that modify the official classification, due to Ghosh et al. (1997) and Levy Yeyati and Sturzenegger (1999) .
Their methodologies are very different, which should provide some sense of whether the results are robust. The former relies to some extent on the official classification, while the latter classifies regimes solely on the basis of the behavior of exchange rates and foreign exchange market intervention. 7 The likelihood ratio has to be greater than zero, since the constrained estimates of the probabilities of transitions between fixes and floats will necessarily be greater than the unconstrained ones (and only those cells of rows 1 and 3 are included in the summation), while the estimates for the intermediate regime (the second row) are identical in the two cases.
Ghosh et al. data
The Ghosh et al. (1997) In defining fixes and floats relatively narrowly, we are guarding against biasing the test of hollowing out towards rejection. A somewhat wider definition would tend to produce more transitions away from the poles, leading to a greater probability of rejection (as we will see below, there have been no exits from currency boards or monetary unions during the 1990s, which is consistent with fixes being an absorbing state). Of course, if the two poles were defined very widely, so that intermediate regimes did not exist in our sample, then hollowing out would follow automatically. But we are far from that extreme.
The transition matrix is first estimated using the whole of the post-Bretton-Woods sample, that is, using data from 1974 through 1997. Given that the trend is to a somewhat greater support for the hypothesis, it is also of interest to test the stability of the transition matrix when the 1990s are compared to the 1980s. Accordingly, we calculate a likelihood ratio test for the null hypothesis that the two subperiods have the same parameters. 10 The value of the test statistic, 86.6, is significant with a p-value < .0001, so that there is evidence of structural instability. Thus there is some question whether a stable Markov process describes the data, and whether the lack of support for hollowing out even using the most recent data will persist into the future.
9 John Williamson has pointed out to me a problem with a classification that includes among the hard fixes only those with no changes in parity: this guarantees no transitions away from such regimes! However, the Ghosh et al. data also includes more objective criteria, such as the establishment of monetary unions or currency boards, and their data do not show any transitions away from these. 10 The test statistic is given in Bhat (1972), equation (5.3.23) . As discussed in section 5.3 of that book, observations of the transition matrix which are zero are ignored in the calculation, and the number of degrees of freedom is reduced accordingly (by two in this case, since for the first subperiod, P(1,3)=0, while P(1,2)=0 in the second subperiod. This yields a chi-square with 4, rather than (T-1)*n*(n-1)=6 degrees of freedom.
Levy Yeyati and Sturzenegger data
These authors completely ignore the official classification and use three variablesmonthly percentage changes in the nominal exchange rate, the standard deviation of monthly percentage changes in the exchange rate, and the volatility of reserves--to classify countries into four exchange rate regimes (flexible, dirty float, crawling peg, and fixed) plus an "inconclusive" group in which the variability of reserves seemed to be irrelevant for exchange rate fluctuations. Exchange rate changes are calculated with respect to the US dollar, the French franc, the deutsche mark, the pound sterling, and Japanese yen, as well as, where relevant, some "local" anchor currencies (such as the Indian rupee for Nepal and the South African rand for Namibia). Cluster analysis is used to identify the groups; flexible rate regimes are assumed to be associated with large average percentage changes in the exchange rate, high exchange rate volatility, and low reserves volatility, and fixed rates the opposite constellation. The time period is 1990-98; the list of countries (110 of them) includes all countries for which the relevant data were available in the IMF's International Financial Statistics. Since not all observations were available for all years, there is a total sample of 955 observations.
For our purposes, we need a three-way classification. We drop the inconclusive observations, and group the dirty float and crawling pegs in the intermediate regime. We It is also notable that the intermediate regime has a lower probability of continuing next period than either fix or flex. However, there is no evidence that fixes or flexes are absorbing states, or together form a closed set; the data strongly reject these hypotheses (only the absorbing state hypothesis applied to fixed rates is reported). On the contrary, the probability of moving to the middle regime in any given year is about 10 percent when starting from a fix and 20 percent from a float, and as a result the invariant distribution attributes a weight of about a quarter to the intermediate regime, and threeeighths to each of the poles, very similar to the actual distribution, suggesting that no major changes are in the pipeline. Thus, there is no support here for the hollowing-out hypothesis, as Levy Yeyati and Sturzenegger themselves note.
Emerging Market Countries
An objection that can be made to the above empirical exercise is that it concerns a large and heterogeneous set of countries, while the hollowing out hypothesis may be intended specifically for the more advanced countries that are most open to international capital flows. In addition, it could be hypothesized that with the passage of time, more and more countries would be included in the category of advanced countries, so that hollowing out would extend eventually to the whole world. In this view, looking at the historical data on all regime transitions would not give a good indication of future trends, since it reflects the shifting composition of the set of countries. The rejection of structural stability between the 1980s and 1990s for the Ghosh et al. data might reflect this.
A useful way of examining this issue is to restrict the set of countries to the "emerging market countries," which are integrated with world capital markets. Of course, using historical data for transitions raises the danger that we are using data which are no longer relevant, or that the trends in capital mobility, which have affected some countries (emerging markets) will spread to others in the future, producing an irreversible movement toward the poles. We therefore also look at a restricted set of countries, those classified as emerging markets, in the 1990s. Results for the Ghosh et al.
data set suggest that eventually fixed rates will prevail as the single exchange rate regime for these countries. This result emerges because of the small number of hard pegs and the short time period, leading to the absence of any exits from this regime. As mentioned in the introduction, there are earlier examples of breakdowns of both monetary unions and currency boards, and this experience is still relevant to an environment with higher capital mobility (capital mobility can be expected to make all exchange rate commitments, including fixes, more fragile). The starkly different implications of the Levy Yeyati-Sturzenegger data set, which strongly rejects the two forms of hollowing-out hypothesis for even this restricted set of countries, also throw doubt on hard pegs as the solution for all countries. The evidence of transitions thus suggests that intermediate regimes will continue to constitute an important fraction of actual exchange rate regimes.
